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WEST VIRGINIA LAW QUARTERLY
E.2d 649, 652 (1941) (verified plea). This latter case raises some
doubt as to whether West Virginia will continue to follow the
Bartley case. The better view favors the admissibility of a with-
drawn plea. 4 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §1067. Therefore, it would
seem sounder and more logical to have admitted the evidence as a
withdrawn plea and the indictment as a part thereof. As to the
third reason, the fact that FED. R. Civ. P. 43 (a) applies, there seems
to be a valid reason for assigning some importance to this. In cases
of doubt as to the admissibility of evidence it should be ad-
mitted. Pfotzer v. Aqua Systems, 162 F.2d 779 (C. C. A. 2d 1947);
Neff v. Pennsylvania R. R., 7 F. R. D. 532 (1948). The intent of
Rule 43 (a) is admissibility not exclusion. 3 MooRE, FEDERAL PRO-
CEDURE 68 (Supp. 1947).
As a matter of policy it would seem that there are conflicting
arguments: (1) the admission of this testimony would result in
the defendants' being prejudiced because of prior wrongs; or (2)
all evidence should be admitted if it will aid in reaching a true
decision. Since the federal courts are bound by FED. R. Civ. P.
43 (a) favoring admissibility, the result in the instant case would
seem correct. Even in state courts where this rule does not apply
the sounder approach would be to admit such evidence as a with-
drawn plea.
D. A. B.
FAIR LABOR STANDARDS ACT - CONTINGENT FEE AGREEMENT -
ALLOWANCE OF REASONABLE ATORNEY's FEE UNDER FLSA CONDI-
TIONED UPON ATORNEY'S. SURRENDER OF CONTINGENT FEE AGREE-
MENT. - In an action by an employee against his employer for over-
time wages under the Fair Labor Standards Act, 52 STAT. 1060
(1938), as amended 29 U. S. C. §201 (Supp. 1948), the trial court
awarded the plaintiff overtime wages, an equal amount as liquidat-
ed damages, costs, and a reasonable attorney's fee. Plaintiff had a
contingent fee agreement with his counsel for compensation in
addition to that which the court would allow. Held, on appeal,
that this private agreement is invalid as being contrary to the pur-
pose of the Act, and the judgment is modified so as to make the
payment of the fee fixed by the court conditional upon the attor-
ney's surrender of all rights to additional compensation under his
agreement with the plaintiff. Affirmed as modified. Harrington
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v. Empire Construction Co., 167 F.2d 389 (C. C. A. 4th 1948).
This holding construes Section 16 (b) of the Fair Labor Stand-
ards Act, which reads in part: "The court in such action shall, in
addition to any judgment awarded to the plaintiff or plaintiffs,
allow a reasonable attorney's fee to be paid by the defendant,
and costs of the action." Under this section a contingent fee was
likewise denied in a prior case, Sykes v. Lochmann, 156 Kan. 223,
132 P.2d 620 (1943), and in a subsequent case, Burke v. Mesta
Mach. Co., 79 F. Supp. 588 (W. D. Pa. 1948). But see Aucoin v.
Mystic Waste Co., 55 F. Supp. 672, 673 (D. C. Mass. 1944), and
Hutchinson v. William C. Barry, Inc., 50 F. Supp. 292, 297 (D. C.
Mass. 1943).
In the absence of statute, it is well settled that an attorney may
contract with his client for the rendition of professional services
and in such contract may fix the amount of compensation to be
paid for such services. Thornley v. Jones, 96 Cal. App. 219, 274
Pac. 93 (1929); Hubbard v. George, 81 W. Va. 538, 94 S. E. 974
(1918); Clifford v. Braun, 71 App. Div. 432, 75 N. Y. Supp. 856
(2d Dep't 1902). Contingent fee agreements, although closely
scrutinized by the courts, are valid if fair and reasonable to the
client. In re Mason's Estate, 174 Misc. 218, 20 N. Y. S.2d 501
(Surr. Ct. 1940); Klauder v. Cregar, 327 Pa. 1, 192 Atl. 667 (1937).
Similar provisions calling for the award by the court of a rea-
sonable attorney's fee have appeared in other federal statutes.
Interstate Commerce Act, 24 STAT. 384 (1887), as amended 49 U.
S. C. §16 (2) (1946); Antitrust laws, 38 STAT. 731 (1914), as amended
15 U. S. C. §15 (1946); Railway Labor Act, 44 STAT. 578 (1926),
as amended 45 U. S. C. §153 (p) (1946); Packers and Stockyards
Act, 46 STAT. 534 (1930), as amended 7 U. S. C. §4 99g (b). (1946);
Merchant Marine Act, 49 STAT. 2015 (1936), 46 U. S. C. §1227
(1946); Communications Act, 48 STAy. 1072 (1934), 47 U. S. C.
§206 (1946).
These statutory provisions for the allowance of attorney's
fees are not identical in their general purpose. It may be pre-
sumed that the provision in the Fair Labor Standards Act for the
award of a reasonable attorney's fee was designed to enable the
employee more easily to prosecute his claim against the employer
and to protect the employee from economic oppression, and this
may explain the restrictive construction placed upon Section
16(b) of the Act by the instant case. Under the other federal
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acts cited above, while many cases have dealt with the reasonable-
ness of the fee so awarded, no case has been found pertaining to
the validity of a private agreement, contingent or otherwise, be-
tween the plaintiff and his counsel for compensation other than
that which the court would allow as a reasonable attorney's fee.
The protective intent of the Fair Labor Standards Act may serve
to distinguish the instant case and prevent the extension and
application of its restrictive construction to other federal acts hav-
ing similar provision for the allowance of a reasonable attorney's
fee.
D. M. B.
FAIR LABOR STANDARDS AcT - REGULAR RATE OF PAY - ExisT-
ENCE THEREOF WHERE SOLE WAGES CONSIST OF Tips. - Plaintiffs
were shoe-shine boys in the men's rest room of an interstate bus
terminal. They were not paid by the defendant bus company,
but were permitted to retain all amounts received by them from
shining shoes, in consideration for which they were required to
keep the rest room clean. Plaintiffs worked fifty-six hours per
week in daily shifts of eight hours each, and their earnings and
tips from shining shoes averaged $8.00 to $10.00 per day. Plain-
tiffs sought to recover overtime compensation'under Section 16 (b)
of the Fair Labor Standards Act, 52 STAT. 1069 (1938), 29 U. S. C.
§216 (b) (1946). The claim was refused by the district court. Held,
on 'appeal, on the supposition that plaintiffs were "employees"
within the meaning of the FLSA, that as there was no regular rate
of pay the right to recover overtime compensation must be deter-
mined under the minimum wage provisions of the Act. Since
the amounts received from shining shoes were creditable as wages,
and were in excess of the statutory minimum requirements, no
recovery was allowed. Judgment affirmed. Moyd v. Atlantic
Greyhound Corp., 170 F.2d 302 (C. C. A. 4th 1948).
The' computation of the "regular rate" and overtime goes to
the fundamentals of the FLSA and is a basic part of the Congres-
sional policy, and must be considered in the same category as an
employee's right to the statutory minimum. Robertson v. Alaska
Juneau Gold Mining Co., 157 F.2d 876 (C. C. A. 9th 1946). The
"regular rate" is not equivalent to the statutory minimum wage
rate prescribed by Section 6 of the Act. Carleton Screw Products
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